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THE HIDDENNESS ARGUMENT 
AND THE GROUND OF ITS SOUNDNESS 
GENERAL COMMENTS ON HOW TO APPROACH THE NATURE OF GOD AND 
ITS IMPACT ON THE ACCURACY OF JOHN SCHELLENBERG’S ARGUMENT 
John Schellenberg’s formulation of the argument from Divine hiddenness 
and his defense of this reasoning undoubtedly stimulate a discussion on the 
argument itself and various related issues. Investigations concerning the value 
of this argumentation inspire philosophical thinking in such matters as the 
knowledge of God, His existence, and His nature. They raise issues of the type 
and nature of possible ways of realizing personal relationships between people 
and God, including friendship. It is impossible not to notice that the discussion 
is also based on some pre-assumptions about the great traditional area of in-
quiry about understanding God and His plans for creatures. It is also about the 
possibility of using the experience of relations between finite personal beings, 
which are people, and the knowledge resulting from this experience for the 
interpretation of the personally understood God. The latter is not equivalent 
to the God of personalistic theism.1 
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In the article, I will refer to the argument from hiddenness as presented in 
the book The Hiddenness Argument2 and the philosophical views expressed 
there that constitute the context for understanding this argument. When exam-
ining the value of this argument, you can turn your attention to three things. 
First, it is possible to check whether the premises of the argument are true and 
convincingly justified. Second, one may wonder whether the premises and the 
conclusion are so related that the conclusion can be derived from the premises. 
This is, in part, a matter of the formal properties of a given reasoning. How-
ever, these are not matters independent of the content of the premises. As it 
turns out, especially in the initial steps of Schellenberg’s reasoning, these mat-
ters combine unfavorably for the argument in premises (1)–(3). In my opinion, 
assuming a particular interpretation of the way the argument works, it also 
takes place in premise (6): “If no perfectly loving God exists, then God does 
not exist.” It seems that to attain the deductive form of his reasoning and the 
related correctness of his inference, the author adopts premises whose truth is 
questionable. Third, one can consider the broader philosophical perspective 
from which the argument grows, the function of the argument, and the meth-
odology of this part of the philosophy of religion. I will present my views on 
all three points below. I will discuss the issue of the philosophical perspective 
and the function of the argument at the end. There is problem with the anthro-
pomorphism in Schellenberg’s philosophy of religion and its significance for 
the conclusiveness of his argument. In the end, I will present a way of using 
the argument in a way that is not entirely unintended by its author but also in 
a way that does not deviate entirely from his goals. 
As already mentioned, I am examining the argument presented by Schel-
lenberg in his book for a more general audience. This argument goes as follows:  
(1) If a perfectly loving God exists, then there exists a God who is always 
open to a personal relationship with any finite person. 
(2) If there exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship with 
any finite person, then no finite person is ever nonresistantly in a state of 
nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists. 
 
2 J. L. SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in 
God (Oxford: OUP, 2015). The Polish translation of Schellenberg’s book was published in 2019 
as Argument z ukrytości. Nowe wyzwanie filozofii dla wiary w Boga. It was translated by Ryszard 
Mordarski, who wrote an extensive introduction titled “Argument z ukrytości Boga Johna L. Schel-
lenberga”; see J. L. Schellenberg, Argument z ukrytości (Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Kazimierza Wielkiego), 9–35. 
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(3) If a perfectly loving God exists, then no finite person is ever nonre-
sistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God 
exists (from 1 and 2). 
(4) Some finite persons are or have been nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief 
in relation to the proposition that God exists. 
(5) No perfectly loving God exists (from 3 and 4). 
(6) If no perfectly loving God exists, then God does not exist. 
(7) God does not exist (from 5 and 6).3 
The argument is preceded in Schellenberg’s book with the scheme of the 
formal type of reasoning under which this reasoning falls. This scheme clearly 
shows that the discussed argument is formally correct. Schellenberg wants to 
reach conclusion 5: “No perfectly loving God exists.” For that purpose, he 
must guarantee the recognition of the three conditional propositions establish-
ing a relationship of some kind between the essential attributes of God’s na-
ture, so to speak, of each God (a God and every God) and between a particular 
fact in the world. The status of the latter relationship is not easy to determine. 
Similarly, Schellenberg does not explain where the relationships between 
states of affairs being correlates of sentences appearing as antecedents 
and consequents in (1)–(3) come from. Indeed, if the argument is to work, the 
fact of hiddenness should be understood by us as impossible if God existed. 
The nature of this impossibility, so to speak, its mechanism, is not entirely 
clear. For the argument to work, the contradiction between a particular fact 
and the essential nature of God (the constant content of the idea of the nature 
of God) must be recognized, and it must, of course, be confirmed that such 
a fact that is inconsistent with God’s existence takes place. 
Moreover, the relationship between God’s perfect love and His openness 
to a personal relationship with any finite person must be necessary, and it must 
be an object of human knowledge. Otherwise, we have no rational, philosophi-
cal grounds for accepting the truth of the first three propositions. In such a case, 
their approval becomes a matter of mere opinion. In my view, this is the actual 
state of affairs. The arguments in the paper show that it is not necessary to 
acknowledge the individual steps of Schellenberg’s supporting reasoning and 
to accept premises (1) and (2). Regardless of the last case, however, it should 
be remembered that the premises of Schellenberg’s argument, if they are to be 
acknowledged, cannot be accidentally true because that would mean that they 
may be false. Therefore, whether their necessity is a de re or de dicto necessity, 
 
3 SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument, 103. 
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they must be accepted as sure, stating that such dependencies cannot differ 
from Schellenberg’s views. I argue that the author has not shown this, only 
showing in some cases the probability of their truth. The mere assumption that 
they are probable is based on the adoption of many debatable assumptions. 
The author himself many times assesses some sentence as obvious, evident or 
self-evident.4 But such declarations do not serve as a justification, especially 
when it is possible to construct possible situations that Schellenberg simply 
excludes either declaratively or by applying the unjustified assumption that 
omnipotent, perfect love will not create a world with such situations. 
The very formal structure of Schellenberg’s argument is not controversial. 
But what about the truth of his premises? Let us note first that in philosophical 
research, in philosophical disputes, it is the value of premises that gives rise 
to the most significant disputes. It is sporadic that they are obvious. This is 
because of the nature of philosophical arguments. It stems from the fact that 
they usually do not concern evident or plain matters, but what is not obvious, 
hidden. To use more poetic language, they concern what is hidden behind the 
veil of objects, phenomena, events, or processes given to us. Extracting the 
truth available requires the effort of reason, the effort of reasoning, the coop-
eration of intellects, intuition, sensitivity, and ingenuity of many people. It is 
also done by confronting your understanding with that of other people and 
their arguments. And so—to some extent—the circle is closed. I am not saying 
that this is the case with every bit of philosophy. But it is so with most meta-
physical and ontological inquiries. On the results of such inquiries, whether 
attained or merely assumed, are dependent inquiries in the field of philosophy 
of religion. 
Let us, then, return to the general issue of the value of premises used in 
Schellenberg’s reasoning. Premises are not simply material signs but are propo-
sitional phrases endowed with an objective, propositional sense. The vital issue 
is the meaning of the terms that make up that sense. The question of the meaning 
of the premises leads us to the meaning of the term “God” used. It also leads to 
the question of the meanings or semiotic functions of other terms with which 
the argument tries to grasp or describe God. It is about both the alleged aspects 
of His nature and the possible ways of His action/non-action concerning human 
persons. In the case of hiddenness, the argument concerns possible actions 
aimed at achieving knowledge of God and preventing the appearance of 
a Nonresistant Nonbelief. Speaking somewhat technically, we ask about the 
meaning of the terms intended to grasp Him in His inner nature and His dynamic 
 
4 Ibid., e.g., 31, 41, 43, 71, 111. 
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relationship to the created world. The understanding of the term openness in 
relation to relationships between people is also controversial in some cases. 
DOUBTS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF EASY KNOWLEDGE OF GOD’S NATURE 
(ESPECIALLY IF HE DOES NOT EXIST) 
Consider a model of a reality in which God exists that includes a world like 
the one we live in. How would human beings get to know God, know His 
existence, and know His nature? This knowledge would allow us to make in-
ferences about His actions about the world, including actions concerning peo-
ple. Would the effects of these presumed actions appear to us as common facts 
of some kind or as standard features of the world? This concerns facts such as 
divine hiddenness, in their neutral sense, and in, all things considered, theistic 
or atheistic meaning. This question is critical. It is also perfectly valid. Espe-
cially if the existence of God is not (does not have to be) obvious to us,5 the 
answer that suggests itself to a researcher of religion is this: people derive 
their knowledge about God, or at least what they treat as knowledge about 
God, primarily from their religion. Moreover, there is no philosophical view 
of God that is not made in the context of some religious tradition, and that 
does not derive its concepts or pre-understandings from it. This is significant 
because Schellenberg insists that a philosopher should distance himself from 
theological concepts when examining an argument. 
When a philosopher encounters an argument intended to refer to God (since 
this term is derived from religion), the question arises from which religion the 
idea derives and from which God, whose religion the argument is to apply to. 
To put it differently: which God is it about and through the prism of whose 
conception? There are polytheistic religions and there are monotheistic ones. 
The notion of God in the three great monotheisms, Christianity, Judaism, and 
Islam, is not identical. There are also religions that do not recognize the ex-
istence of a single and only one God (with an upper-case G). It is true of 
Buddhism, just as it is true of polytheistic Hinduism.6 
 
5 One must distinguish between the obviousness to different types of knowing subjects. The 
existence of God is undoubtedly evident to Himself, but it is not immediately evident to human beings.  
6 The term ‘god’ is not identical to the term ‘God’ and their semiotic functions differ. Cf. Józef 
HERBUT, “Z syntaktycznej problematyki języka religijnego,” in Józef HERBUT, Artykuły i szkice. 
Z metodologii i teorii metafizyki, filozoficznej analizy języka religii oraz etyki i metaetyki (Opole: 
Wydział Teologiczny Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2008), 241–43. See also Joseph M. BOCHEŃSKI, The 
logic of religion (New York: New York University Press, 1965). 
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As He has traditionally been understood, God is not a thing among other 
things, whether He exists or not. He is not an object in the world. He is not 
something of the kind that we recognize in the direct empirical perception of 
the world. Most people seem to derive the concepts by which they grasp God 
and their first judgments about Him in the context of the religions they follow 
or their parents or guardians do. If someone comes from a secular environ-
ment, then they derive this concept by acquainting themselves, to some extent, 
with other people whose religion they do not profess. The concept of God is 
a religious concept. It is part of a specific religion, as opposed to God himself 
understood as being. This is true whether God exists or not. Thus, explaining 
why someone has such concepts and beliefs about God most often is an expla-
nation that depends on pointing to specific social and personal facts. It in-
volves a person’s various relationships to a religious community teaching their 
religion. They are related to the read Holy Texts as well as religious and the-
ological books she read, meetings with other people, events in which she par-
ticipated, stories, testimonies she heard. Sometimes this includes the anti-tes-
timony of one or another adherent of a given religion.7 All these matters can 
then be the subject of reasoning, attempting to sift right concepts and true 
sentences away from inaccurate phrases and false opinions. 
The problem is more profound than that. Even if the fact that the context 
of the discourse of the philosophy of religion is a particular religious tradition 
narrows the scope of possible understanding of God and constitutes a step 
towards identifying the denotation of the term God, within a given religious 
tradition, there are different ways of understanding the referred God. It is un-
doubtedly the case in Christian theology. And it is not only about the differ-
ences in the ways of understanding God in the tradition of Catholic, Orthodox, 
or Reformed thought. Such differences also occur within, for example, Ca-
tholicism itself, where God is understood differently by the Thomistic tradi-
tion, which emphasizes the rationality of God’s nature, and the Franciscan 
tradition, which emphasizes divine freedom.8 
 
7 Philosophers, members of the academic community of people with similar interests, a similar 
way of thinking, and living in the world, usually consider essential what can be learned about God 
based on reasoning and various rational insights. It really is a fundamental issue for philosophy, whose 
task, contrary to the metaphilosophical opinion popular among analytic philosophers, is to justify and 
interpret what we already know and discover new things by explaining and expanding the scope of 
knowledge available to us. However, for the formation of the first critical opinions about God, 
religion, the ultimate reality, sometimes accurate, sometimes not, contacts with people of religion are 
of great importance. Religions have a social dimension here, too. 
8 A good example is the influence of different models of God’s freedom on the understanding of 
human morality. A widely known book by Pinckaers explains it in depth; see Servais-Théodore 
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One might think that these are irrelevant to the issue at hand. This is not 
the case, however. Schellenberg’s inquiries about God’s nature, His love, or 
openness lie on the same level—the level of human interpretation of the (al-
leged, presumed) Being of God. So which God’s non-existence does Schel-
lenberg want to demonstrate? In other words, in what concept (model) of God 
does Schellenberg work? The answer to this question is relevant in two ways. 
First of all, in our assessment of what his argumentation de facto suggests with 
its premises, statements, and supporting reasoning. This, in turn, is important 
for the reader’s consent or refusal of the proposed premises, and acceptance 
of their value. 
Schellenberg conducts the discussion as if things were obvious. It starts 
with God and it should be clear what is being said. In fact, nothing is evident 
here, and many things are unclear and out of focus. Second, suppose we were 
to agree that the argument makes it possible to reject the existence of a par-
ticular Being. In that case, the question arises which Being is thus excluded, 
and according to which conception, and which Being (given other accounts) 
not. Even if there are ways of relating to God intellectually, which in some 
cases do not use a description of the divine nature, recognizing or denying the 
existence of one or another God requires the use of some description and a cor-
responding understanding of God. We obtain the results by reasoning about 
such a God; the divine nature determined by such-and-such a description, con-
cept, or conditional need not automatically apply to God understood differ-
ently. The differences between them may be subtle enough that an argument 
pertinent to God-designated by concept1 misses when it comes to God-desig-
nated by the concept2. Schellenberg seems to realize this, and therefore he will 
treat his argument so that it is about all God, or in other words, that it is about 
every God and the conclusion is that no God exists. All the more so, for such 
a robust application, his argument should provide an appropriate justification. 
A careful examination of the entire logic of his argument contained in the book 
reveals numerous partial and insufficient justifications for its essential claims. 
It must be remembered that depending on the specific concept that we are 
dealing with of the Divine Being, His nature, attributes, goals, and ways of 
acting we are dealing with, we will either agree to the probability of some 
effects of His actions in the-world-of such-God or not. This is irrespective of 
whether the context is an argument for God’s existence, an argument against 
 
PINCKAERS, Les sources de la morale chrétienne. Sa méthode, son contenu, son histoire (Fribourg: 
Editions Universitaires, 1993); English translation: The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Mary 
T. Noble (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995). 
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His existence, or an argument that assigns specific attributes to God and tries 
to deduce others from them.9 We should emphasize here that all these matters 
are binding and logically independent of the resolution of the question of 
whether thus understood God exists and whether there is any God of religion 
at all. Nor are these claims based on any religion being recognized as revealed 
or true. They may be heuristically inspired by various theological statements 
but do not assume their truth. These are the results of an a priori reflection on 
the nature of the relationship of human culture and alleged knowledge of the 
reality presupposed, assumed, and implied by that culture. They also concern 
religion and the conditions of possible ways of getting to know the objects 
that the followers of different religions refer to. They concern possible ways 
of knowing the existence or non-existence of such objects, natures, and ac-
tions. They determine the conditions for the occurrence of a given type of 
cognition and its value, including certainty/uncertainty. Knowledge of the 
methods of practicing God’s ontology and metaphysics is primarily assumed.  
THEISM REJECTS ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN REASONING  
AND LANGUAGE ABOUT GOD 
Since Schellenberg begins with what he views as evident matters concern-
ing the concept of the God of theism, it is also worth turning to these concepts 
for us. It is a fact that the three great theistic religions, when describing God, 
emphasize His uniqueness in comparison to other beings, which are referred 
to as creatures. Contrary to Schellenberg’s suggestions, this uniqueness does 
not lie in His distance or inaccessibility.10 Without going into complicated 
metaphysical inquiries about God’s creation and action towards creatures, let 
us note that theistic religions claim that God is both immanent and transcend-
ent to the world he created. He is to be present in it as the Creator, the Cause 
of everything, and the First or Final Cause. He is to be the co-cause of its 
operation and its effects, and as the Omniscient, He is to know His creation 
better than it knows itself. As Almighty Providence, he is to look after the 
welfare of creatures. At the same time, precisely as the Uncreated Cause, as 
the Giver of being and life, as the Omni-God, it surpasses the world beings in 
its existence in a way that is incomprehensible to beings with our limited ability 
 
 9 In the analytical philosophy of religion, especially in analytical philosophical theology there are 
many disputes concerning, for example, the relation of the attributes of knowledge or God’s power to 
the possibilities, impossibility, or probability of such things in the world as free human action, evil, 
a world without evil. The complex research they contain is often carried out with great precision. 
10 SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument, 48. 
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to understand things. Our understanding of God, derived from religion, as 
teachers and prophets warn, is prone to individual error because His paths are 
not our ways, and His thoughts are not our thoughts. 
Man, understood generally, as a bodily and spiritual being at the same time, 
tries, as suggested by these religious traditions, to transcend his understanding 
adapted to the comprehension of material things and matters of this world, 
directing his mind towards the First Cause and the Ultimate End. To avoid the 
danger of idolatry, these traditions developed extensive philosophical and theo-
logical systems, distinguishing what can be understood positively about God 
who reveals himself and what should be understood only negatively. They try 
to develop a theory of religious language to prevent an anthropomorphic com-
prehension of the Creator that would conflate Him with creatures, rather than 
seeing Him as the Ultimate Source, Pure Act of Existence, First Being, Being 
above beings, or God without being. Equating the Creator with the things of 
this world and understanding Him like creatures, measuring Being with the 
measure of contingent things, incomplete beings, is the root of erroneous 
thinking about God. Furthermore, these things, taken as a measure, according 
to these traditions, usually do not achieve their fullness, proper to their spe-
cies, and designed by God as their exemplary and purposeful Cause. Human 
love and rationality should not be taken as the norm of the divine. If, then, 
Schellenberg wishes to demonstrate the non-existence of the God of theism, 
he should construct and examine his argument by working with the philosophi-
cal concept of the God of theism and not with the concept of some heavenly 
loving Omnipotent Superperson, one thirsting for the love of human person 
and who at the same time has no limitations in creating a world fit for the 
possibility of a relationship being realized at any moment. 
METHODOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY 
If, in religious traditions, a philosophy of the existence and nature of God is 
adopted or formulated, then in most cases, the creator of such philosophy either 
does it top-down, drawing the concept of God directly from his tradition, or 
bottom-up. Then he faces a problem whether the results of philosophical inves-
tigations he formulates apply to God who is worshiped and worshiped in a given 
religion R1. In other words, it is faced with the problem of whether the Being 
grasped/designated by the content of its philosophical results is, in fact, identi-
cal with the God of a given religion, especially if philosophy attributes to people 
modest powers concerning the scope of knowing God. We deal with this situa-
tion in the case of the investigations of Schellenberg, who, in his understanding 
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of God, uses the understanding of God in the spirit of Western Christianity, the 
so-called personalistic theism developed in the 20th-century analytical philos-
ophy of religion.11 It is very often the case that this tradition uses anthropo-
morphic terms.12 
Philosophy, contrary to the minimalist opinion popular among analytical 
philosophers, should broaden our cognition. A philosophical knowledge of 
God cannot simply be a logically correct transformation of religious opinion. 
But wherefrom should human reason derive cognition beyond the claims of par-
ticular religions? It seems that there are only two ways of such understanding 
that can aspire to claim of reliability. The first is quasi-experiential because it 
aims to know the existence of God as the Creator, inferring about His exist-
ence from the existence and properties of the world. In the course of reasoning 
coming from the world, the existence of the First Cause, Pure Act, Pure Being, 
on which the rest of reality depends ontologically, is reached. Only through 
the analysis and deduction of the attributes of the Being stated in the reasoning, 
one comes to a limited understanding of this Being. At the same time, its ontic 
structure, being, due to the Transcendence stated in the reasoning, which is 
defined as the Necessary Being, Pure Being, Absolute Simplicity, Eternity or 
Omnipotence, is to be the reason why it is difficult to apply to God human 
conceptualism and language matching limited beings. 
The second method of knowing God, recognized by some philosophers, is 
purely a priori knowledge. In their opinion, we would have a purely a priori 
knowledge of the existence and nature of God, independent of our knowledge 
of the world. The existence of God would, for example, be known intuitively 
in our mind, in our soul, and at heart, while His nature would be given to us 
in a priori concept, e.g., as is in the Perfect Being theology of St. Anselm or 
in Cartesian metaphysics. Proper reflection on the content of this concept is 
 
11 Ibid., 49–50, 68–69. Cf. Roger POUIVET, “Against Theistic Personalism: What Modern Episte-
mology Does to Classical Theism,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 1 (2018): 
1–19, https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.1871. Some fragments of Schellenberg’s arguments, espe-
cially descriptions of the personal relationship, give the impression that the theological concepts and 
the meanings used by this author are immersed in the personalistic conceptualism of American Chris-
tianity in the 20th and 21st centuries. It can be doubted whether, for example, the 19th or 20th-century 
Russian philosopher would have found a common language with Schellenberg. An example is Boris 
Wisheslavcev, who emphasizes the importance of the relationship with God’s grace and love for the 
transformation of man; Борис ВЫШЕСЛАВЦЕВ, Этика преображенного Эроса [The Ethics of the 
Transformed Eros] (Paris: YMCA Press, 1932). 
12 An example of such anthropomorphization is understanding God’s knowledge in terms of 
knowing certain beliefs. Cf. the classical paper of Nelson PIKE, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary 
Action,” Philosophical Review 74, no. 1 (1965): 27–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/2183529. 
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to allow us to deduct individual attributes of God and to know the realm of 
His possible actions towards creatures. 
These two ways of a purely natural, rational cognition of the existence of 
God overlap to a certain extent in the case of specific philosophical attempts to 
understand God’s nature. They also constitute the basis of the knowledge that 
the philosophy of religion carries out in a strict sense. The philosophy of reli-
gion is a philosophical inquiry into the elements of the phenomenon of various 
religions, including the religious beliefs that constitute the credo of various par-
ticular religions.13 They also include beliefs of those religions, their descriptions 
of God or attributes that God has. The analysis of such beliefs and the meaning 
of the sentences expressing them is part of many works belonging to the disci-
pline called philosophical theology in the analytical philosophy of religion. 
THE NARROW CONCEPT OF GOD IN THEISTIC PERSONALISM 
How does what we have said above apply to Schellenberg’s argument? He 
uses opinions inspired by Christianity, modifying the concept of God in such 
a way that he disambiguates it, understanding God very narrowly. However, it 
does not provide the knowledge that would justify the truth of this construction.  
This author tries to convince us to recognize a set of premises about the 
nature of God. These premises are to establish essential truths about God, his 
love, openness, and its consequences for the worlds in which God exists. 
Where does Schellenberg learn about the nature of God? From the tradition of 
theistic personalism of the analytical philosophy of religion. Where should the 
addressee of his argument derive this knowledge from? The acceptance or re-
jection of the premises of an argument should not be a matter of random judg-
ment, some feeling about the premises, wishful thinking. It should flow from 
the knowledge of their truth. 
Moreover, such knowledge presupposes knowledge of reality, which is 
a correlate of the appropriate propositions. The author of the argument seems 
to see the matter differently. The basis for accepting the premises is their evi-
dent nature. We should be guided by our sense of plausibility of the premises. 
This, in turn, is to be deepened by thought experiments in which, in the light 
of our intuitions, we will interpret certain behaviors as open or devoid of open-
ness. On this basis, mainly in opinions about human modus operandi, we should 
readily see that the premises of the argument about God are evidently acceptable. 
 
13 BOCHEŃSKI, The Logic of Religion, 52–54. 
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In Schellenberg’s story, the matter looks very optimistic. Well, it seems that 
however much could be hidden in the nature of God, in the aspect of matters on 
which the validity of the argument against the non-existence of God depends, 
these are plausible and even self-evident truths. If there are any difficulties or 
doubts formulated by the unconvinced, they can be quickly dispelled, taking 
into account that God is the Almighty. Furthermore, if, in Schellenberg’s opinion, 
these counterarguments against these difficulties do not dispel the doubts, it is 
evidence of someone’s religious bias stemming from her loyalty to a specific 
concept of God in whom she believes. She should reverse her thinking and 
abandon her theistic intuitions in favor of some other form of ultimism other 
than theism. 
Are things really as Schellenberg suggests? And especially: Has Schellen-
berg presented a convincing argument for his view of the matter which he wants 
to bring round his readers to? 
THE TRUTHFULNESS OF PREMISES (1)–(3) 
OF SCHELLENBERG’S ARGUMENT, THEIR JUSTIFICATION, 
AND CORRECTNESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL STEPS OF REASONING 
How should we evaluate the value of the first three sentences of Schellenberg’s 
argument? The three conditionals are as follows:  
(1) If a perfectly loving God exists, then there exists a God who is always 
open to a personal relationship with any finite person. 
(2) If there exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship  
with any finite person, then no finite person is ever nonresistantly in 
a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists. 
(3) If a perfectly loving God exists, then no finite person is ever nonre-
sistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God 
exists (from 1 and 2). 
These sentences establish a relationship that is to occur directly between 
God’s perfect love and his openness to a personal relationship with any finite 
person and indirectly between God’s perfect love and the existence of any 
finite person which is ever nonresistant in a state of nonbelief to the proposi-
tion that God exists. Prima facie, these sentences establish the necessary re-
lationship between the two attributes of God, his perfect love and openness, 
and the second relationship between openness and the non-occurrence of the 
fact of nonresistant nonbelief in God’s existence. The latter fact Schellenberg 
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calls the hiddenness of God, or even shorter, the hiddenness. This God’s hid-
denness does not actually make sense of a hidden God but “is used in a decid-
edly non-literal sense, as a way of talking about facts that would hide God, were 
there to be a God.” It is about facts that could be given a theistically/atheisti-
cally neutral description, like the inculpability of much nonbelief.14 
Someone might have the impression that the technically and very narrowly 
and unequivocally understood openness of God is introduced only as a means 
of showing that God’s perfect love excludes the hiddenness.15 Regardless of 
whether such a remark would be accurate, under the transition from (1) through 
(2) we obtain conditional 3, the consequent of which is the negation of the 
occurrence of the hiddenness. Furthermore, in the next step, this consequent 
is negated, which allows Schellenberg, in a valid way, to conclude that there 
is no perfectly loving God. All this only works with a very ambiguous and 
narrow concept of these matters. The question of the formal correctness of the 
transition from (1) and (2) to (3) is not a problem. The problem lies in the 
acceptance of (1) and (2). 
NATURE OF GOD: DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER WE KNOW  
WHAT A PERFECTLY LOVING GOD (ALWAYS) DOES 
How should we evaluate these two premises? They are related to each 
other. However, let us start with the first: (1) “If a perfectly loving God exists, 
then there exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship with any 
finite person.” How do things look for a researcher who is neither an abstract 
or religious theist, nor an atheist? 
The first reaction that this question may provoke may come as a surprise 
that such knowledge is expected of us. Let us assume that the inquiry is con-
ducted in a situation where the inquiring persons who read the argument have 
no knowledge of God. They do not follow any of the theistic religions. They 
do not know whether the Being called God exists or Who it is. They know 
neither that it exists nor that it does not exist. If we are in this situation, how 
would we know if it is the case that if a perfectly loving God exists, then there 
exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship with any finite 
person? How would we know that if God were to be perfectly loving, He 
would be open to a personal relationship with any finite person? 
 
14 SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument, 16. 
15 Ibid., 14–16. 
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Moreover, that he would be open because of some necessity, and not be-
cause he (only) could be such? How could I know that if God were a perfectly 
loving being, He would by necessity (always) be open to a relationship with 
me? After all, I am one of the finite persons. It does not seem that someone 
who, all things considered, has no knowledge of these matters is making 
a mistake. However, Schellenberg thinks otherwise. 
The problem is that if we are in such a situation, we do not have the faintest 
idea of God’s perfect love and whether there is an essential relationship between 
such love and God’s openness. It is worth recalling that it does not matter 
whether we mean the de dicto modality or the de re modality for the sake of 
criticism. The important thing is that it has to be a modality that will secure 
acceptance of premise (1). What kind of relationship would it be? Does it mean 
that openness essentially “comes” from the attribute of God’s perfect love? 
Or maybe it is not so, and are they independent but necessarily co-occurring 
attributes of God? In the latter case, it would also be the case that whenever 
God is perfectly loving, He is also open to a relationship with any finite being. 
However, does such a connection even exist? If we knew God’s nature, then we 
could no doubt accept or reject premise (1) on that basis. However, when we do 
not have an insight into the nature of God, He is not known to us, and the situ-
ation is entirely different. In fact, someone could answer that we have no idea 
how these things are. 
Let us emphasize that this is the situation with which Schellenberg deals. 
He is convinced that God does not exist. Furthermore, the argument under 
discussion is not the basis of this belief.16 It is certainly not the only or the 
primary basis of his atheistic view of the world. It also seems that it is not the 
case that Schellenberg is assuming that we have an insight into the nature of 
a nonexistent God. There is, in my opinion, the second reason, besides trying 
to make arguments deductive, why premises (1) and (2) are formulated as 
conditionals. These premises must be true when the conclusion is true (7). 
Therefore, if our recognition of this truth is to depend on knowledge of it, then 
it must be knowledge that we can have independently of our knowledge of 
God, regardless of the fact of His existence. So, it must be knowledge of the 
nature of perfect love and its relation to openness to any finite being, which 
knowledge simply finds application to (nonexistent) God. 
 
16 Incidentally, it is a pity that the author did not give reasons why he became an atheist and why 
he is currently an atheist. Probably the discussed argument is some of them. Atheism, like belief in 
God, are not attitudes that are obtained independently of or solely on the basis of philosophical and 
theological reasoning. 
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This raises two questions. First, where are we to get this knowledge from? 
Second, in particular, how do we know that what we consider knowledge is 
actually knowledge? How do we know that we are not deluded into believing 
that such an application takes place? If he exists, God can be impenetrable to 
our intellects, not because he is smaller than we imagine and interpret him, but 
because he is more excellent. Regardless of whether it was to be taken in the 
abstract, the knowledge of the essential relations between love and openness, 
which knowledge supposedly includes as a particular subclass that set of rela-
tions that occurs in the case of every (every, any) God, or would it be simply 
knowing of divine nature, it may be argued that we have no idea whether or not 
it should include recognition of such an essential relationship. Perhaps God’s 
being is so different from the finite beings known to us that His perfect love, 
whatever it is, neither leads to openness to a personal relationship with any fi-
nite person nor coexists with such openness. Can we rule this out? 
A PARTICULAR CONCEPT OF GOD’S OPENNESS  
We cannot assess the value of premise (1) without knowing what openness is. 
Furthermore, it is specified in premise (2), which defines in entanglement how 
we should understand this openness. Well, this openness should be so under-
stood that it excludes even one moment of nonresistant nonbelief of any finite 
person. 
It is not so that if (any) God has been open to a particular person, there may 
be times in that person’s life where he may be nonresistant in a state of nonbelief 
in relation to the proposition that God exists. No, on the contrary, premise (2) 
clearly states that “no finite person is ever nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief 
in relation to the proposition that God exists.” This condition imposed by 
Schellenberg on the openness of God greatly restricts the understanding of this 
openness. However, it also means that this openness, contrary to Schellenberg’s 
intentions and examples, is not predicated on God (and the fictional characters 
in his examples) in the same sense as we pronounce openness about people in 
everyday situations. Schellenberg, as is evident from his interpretation of these 
cases, judges explicitly with certainty that they are examples of lack of open-
ness. The Not Open principle performs a similar function. These matters, how-
ever, are not evident even in the case of the example from chapter 5, as opposed 
to the example from chapter 4. Even more so, they are not evident in the lives of 
real people and in their application to God. 
Understandably, this line of argumentation is needed to conclude deduc-
tively (5): No perfectly loving God exists. However, with such a strongly limited, 
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disambiguated concept of divine openness, even more significant doubts arise. 
Namely, why would there be a necessary relationship between such openness 
and divine perfect love? And why would a perfectly loving God be open-just-
in this-way? 
HOW DOES SCHELLENBERG JUSTIFY ADOPTING PREMISES (1) AND (2)? 
In the words of the author of the proof, these claims were developed “on 
the basis of some careful thought about the nature of God” (38).17 Let us start 
with premise (1) and its notions of perfect love and openness to a personal 
relationship. This premise conditionally establishes the necessary dependence 
between the two supposed attributes of God. 
If a perfectly loving God exists, then there exists a God who is always open 
to a personal relationship with any finite person. 
This premise is defined as “initially plausible”: “Having seen, as you prob-
ably have, that the premise looks initially plausible, we now need to inspect it 
more carefully. Otherwise, we would not be doing our job as philosophers.” 
This premise, when I first became acquainted with it, did not strike me as 
“initially plausible.” Perhaps this is due to the attitude that we should be crit-
ical of any proposed arguments, trying to read their structure and content neu-
trally. Perhaps this is because of the principle that when we begin to make 
judgments about a God presumed to exist by theistic religions, these judg-
ments cannot simply be taken from our daily experience of finite beings or 
constitute a generalization of our daily experience. Regardless of the reasons 
why this premise did not appeal to me and I remained neutral as to its value, 
it did not seem plausible to me. 
WHAT IS GOD’S PERFECT LOVE, AND HOW IS IT  
RELATED TO GOD’S OPENNESS? 
WHAT IS PERFECT LOVE? 
After the premise is initially assessed as “plausible,” Schellenberg goes on 
to argue for it. He starts by explaining what he understands by the term “per-
fect love”: “Perfect love is the best, the greatest, the deepest love that could 
possibly be realized in God. It’s ultimate love” (39). It seems to confirm that 
 
17 I follow my direct quotations from Schellenberg with page numbers. 
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the knowledge with which Schellenberg operates is more general than just 
knowledge of the nature of God. It is the knowledge of love and how such 
love is realized in God. Love is something that God can participate in, and in 
Him, it can be realized to the highest degree. 
So if God possesses love at all, then this love must be unsurpassably great—more 
sublime than that of any mere mortal and indeed expressed in an ultimate way.… And 
even if we can’t know everything that perfect love would do or refrain from doing, it 
may be that we can just see, or that simple arguments can help us see, that it necessarily 
brings certain things with it.… What we want to know here is whether we can just see 
that ultimate love would necessarily bring with it openness to personal relationship. (40)  
Schellenberg sees the problem with our ignorance of what perfect love is. 
We do not know the full extent of what such love does and does not do. How-
ever, we know what it must do. How do we know it? It may be that we just 
see/understand it, or we see/understand it through simple arguments.  
It should be noted at this point that it is not an abstractly understood love 
that does something but a loving subject that always does it. Schellenberg’s 
approach suggests that this author understands love as an action arising from 
necessity, as determined by the nature of love. However, in the case of love—
a gift, because this is what this should be about, its nature is voluntary. Thus, 
agape love, Caritas, and gracious love are unnecessary and manifest in many 
ways. Of course, it may be that the subject of love usually acts in some way. 
However, the modal may should be emphasized here since may implies it does 
not have to be that way. This is a severe mistake in understanding love. Perhaps, 
however, things are different. In numerous places in the book, Schellenberg 
constructs this story about a loving God as if the love he attributes to God is 
the love of the need of a loving one, striving for a relationship with his be-
loved.18 This, however, is opposed by Schellenberg’s statements, in which he 
distances himself from understanding openness as God’s desire for a proper 
relationship to take place, for example, in the “Misinterpretations” section.19 
Schellenberg makes it difficult for readers by not describing clearly what this 
ultimate God’s love is. Perhaps, then, this necessary relationship of openness 
(always open) with perfect love is based on Eros’ love for people?20  
Recognizing the necessity of the relationship between perfect love and 
openness is itself necessary to obtain the effect that since the necessary effect 
 
18 Ibid., 43–44, 101, 105–6.  
19 Ibid., 105–7. 
20 Ibid., 100. 
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of this love is missing, which is the specifically understood openness of God, 
we are not dealing with love (or more precisely - with a perfectly loving God). 
We need to remember that it is possible that a perfectly loving God is not open 
in the specific way Schellenberg defines it. If it were not so, then the antecedent 
of the first premise could not be denied in the next moves. And thus, it would 
be impossible to achieve (5), which is also an antecedent of (6) leading by 
simple reasoning to the thesis of atheism. Then the entire deductive structure 
breaks down, and Schellenberg fails to reach an atheistic conclusion. 
We also remember that the knowledge of this love must be the basis for 
recognizing premise (1) and indirectly (3). Therefore, Schellenberg wants to 
avoid engaging with this problem by suggesting to us that even if we do not 
have knowledge of God’s perfect love, we simply understand, or we can see 
by means of simple arguments, that “ultimate love would necessarily bring 
with it openness to personal relationship.” Therefore, he replaces the argument 
for truth (1) with the question: “Can we just see that ultimate love would nec-
essarily bring with it openness to personal relationship? But what is a personal 
relationship?” (40). 
When Schellenberg describes a personal relationship between man and 
God, although he describes it as two-way, he focuses positively mainly on the 
human side. “This is positively meaningful interaction between persons that 
they are aware of experiencing each another.” It is about relations related to 
the capacities of mind and heart needed, such as a capacity to feel the presence 
of God, recognizing it as such, a capacity to exhibit attitudes of trust, grati-
tude, and obedience to God. He does not pay much attention to the specific 
nature of this relationship, to the way of entering it and developing it. From 
time to time, there are comments about it in various places in the book, usually 
denoting it in terms of negatives. This is one of the weaker moments in Schel-
lenberg’s philosophical theology. 
WHAT IS OPENNESS OF GOD? 
Once we “know” what type of attitudes or relationships are involved, we 
can look again at the meaning of God’s “openness” involved. At this point in 
his book, Schellenberg uses what the ancients called a dialectical argument. 
It appeals to intuitions shared by a significant number of people. Such argu-
ments do not guarantee the truth of the conclusion, even if they are structured 
in a deductive manner. 
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So what is God’s openness that is meant here? Schellenberg begins by ex-
pressing the idea that openness is to be intuitively known to us. What are our 
supposed intuitions about? Of course, interpersonal relationships. 
Here we’ve arrived at the very heart of the argument. I expect you’ll have a pretty good 
intuitive grasp of what is meant by “openness” in this context. But let’s look at the term 
more closely, for this will help to expose the great plausibility of the premise in which 
it appears. I want, in particular, to underline how thin or minimal a notion we’ve got 
here. (40) 
He believes, or is simply suggesting to us, that we already have an intui-
tively imposing sense of openness on which we can rely. And when we take 
a closer look at this term, we can see that premise (1) is very plausible. It now 
appears that the knowledge of God’s openness is based on knowing the mean-
ings of the words of human language to describe the types of relationships 
between human beings known to us. The matter could be trivial because what 
language should we speak about God?21 The problem, however, is not whose 
language it is and who shapes it, but what its object is, what its meaning is, 
and how this meaning should be adjudicated about its object. Schellenberg 
shapes his narrative in the book as if he did not realize that in the background 
of the speech about God, there are numerous problems concerning the sense 
of theological language, ways of thinking and speaking about God, and prob-
lems with the occurrence of appropriate reasoning allowing to derive new 
propositions about God without any logical gap.22 Probably, Schellenberg re-
alizes that there have been such considerations in theistic traditions for thou-
sands of years—that they existed even before Christian theology—and only 
omits them for some reason.23 He seems to be satisfied with the remark at the 
end of chapter 4, suggesting that we ultimately use language to describe God’s 
love in the same sense as we refer to human love.24 However, if it applies to 
his use of expressions in speaking about God, it only proves the anthropomor-
phization of his concept of God. It is by no means a point with a normative, 
regulative meaning on how we should understand terms such as love, which 
we apply to God. 
 
21 But cf. Maimonides’s and Aquinas’s views. 
22 Richard SWINBURNE, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: OUP, 1977); Gregory ROCCA, “The 
Distinction Between Res Significata and Modus Significandi in Aquinas’s Theological Epistemology,” 
The Thomist 55, no. 2 (1991): 173–97. 
23 These problems were studied by Middle Platonists (1st–3rd centuries BC). Damian MRUGALSKI, 
“Agnostos Theos: relacja między nieskończonością a niepoznawalnością Boga w doktrynach medio-
platoników,” Roczniki Filozoficzne 67, no. 3 (2019): 25–51. 
24 SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument, 48–49. 
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Let us go back to the concept of God’s openness proposed by Schellenberg. 
He emphasizes that this concept is minimal, comprising the lack of action that 
would make it impossible to remain in an appropriate relationship for the crea-
ture seeking such a relationship at a given time. God’s openness to a relation-
ship does not require that God do any particular thing to pursue a relationship: 
No, being open in the relevant sense at a certain time simply means not (then) being 
closed. It means not through one’s own actions or omissions making it impossible for 
the other, whom one loves, to participate in personal relationship with one at that time 
should the other wish to do so.… It means that it will be possible for creatures … to 
participate in relationship with God; if they want to, they will be able to do so simply 
by trying to do so…. If thus open to relationship, God sees to it that nothing God does 
or fails to do puts relationship with God out of reach for finite persons at the time in 
question. (41, emphasis mine) 
Even if it is a minimal concept of openness, it is pretty logically complicated. 
Let us skip the question of how we know that a particular state of affairs 
proves that S’s does not act to prevent it, and it is not the case that there is 
another reason for the failure of a given relationship. Another thing is that 
such an innocent-sounding term of minimum openness can be read as an ex-
pectation of possible participation in a relationship with God at will. At a lower 
stage of intellectual development, someone from the old epochs could treat 
such an expectation as an expression of an utterly non-minimal claim. 
It is essential to recognize that the element which, according to Schellen-
berg, is a necessary condition for a personal relationship between God and 
man of a kind worthy of interest (for God and man) is being convinced that 
God exists.25 It is not God’s action of different types, nor the vague factual 
knowledge of God, which is not recognized as such. It is also not a search, 
desire, or striving for God that does not contain a psychological judgment that 
God exists. Nor is it the direct consciousness of God that is not expressed in 
any belief about God. What is a necessary condition for this desired relationship 
from the point of view of perfect (and imperfect human) love is the conviction 
that God exists. God that is minimally open will ensure that this condition is 
not compromised. 
Of course, if we want to rely on an intuitive grasp, things can seem positive. 
If we were God, would we not make sure that a relationship with us was not 
beyond the reach of finite beings? Is it the same as making sure it is on-
demand? Possible at any time, as we would like, as these finite beings? Maybe 
 
25 Ibid., 58. 
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yes. Perhaps not. Someone might suggest that it depends on what circum-
stances the person would be in and what we would like for him, and how the 
result of this minimal openness would relate to these goals. However, Schel-
lenberg has a prepared reply to this. I will return to this in what follows. 
ARGUMENT FOR THE NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP  
OF MINIMAL OPENNESS WITH PERFECT LOVE 
Schellenberg’s reasoning is as follows. Schellenberg asks whether God can 
have the quality of perfect love and not be open in this minimal sense. He 
replies that this is not possible. To be exact, he does not say it outright. He 
states this in a roundabout way by assigning such an expectation to the main 
premise of the argument: “Could our definition of perfect love rightfully be 
deprived of even so weak a relational condition as is represented by the phrase 
‘always open’ when it is taken in this minimal sense? The main premise of the 
hiddenness argument expects that you will say no” (41). 
Of course, this is a kind of metaphor—a metaphor of the expectation of the 
central premise of the argument that we will say yes to the necessary 
connection between the perfect love of God and that (His) thin openness. 
Otherwise, we will not find premise (1) convincing. It is true. Nevertheless, 
of course, that metaphorically speaking is not the evidence of the truth of (1), 
it is not any philosophical argument for the truth of (1). It is not a justification 
of its plausibility! 
It seems that Schellenberg does not present any ontological argumentation 
in Chapter 4 that minimal openness thus understood is essentially contained 
in perfect love. Instead, he states that the truth of the sentence in question is 
self-evident in itself: “Such minimal openness as we’ve identified seems self-
evidently to belong to divine love” (41). It is a matter of intuitive vision.26 A 
declaration of the self-obviousness of a particular statement or fact for 
Schellenberg does not, however, constitute a convincing argument for others. 
It is not that Schellenberg does not argue at all. He presents an argument 
of a different kind. It describes the constructed situation of a child of parents 
who are not interested in contact with their son. He suggests that we can 
deepen our (allegedly) intuitive understanding of the truth of this necessary 
relationship of love with openness by presenting ourselves with situations 
 
26 This reminds me of the teachings of my logic teacher from the period of my university studies, 
Stanisław Kiczuk, who suggested that we should always pay special attention to those statements that 
are referred to as self-evident. 
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from human life. The description of this situation is to be reduced to the absurd 
belief of a fictional character of a friend who believes that his parents so 
wonderfully love him, and at the same time, they are not open to being in a 
relationship with him—at least not at that time. 
One may agree that a situation constructed as Schellenberg does, is absurd. 
It is so because part of its structure is the lack of openness to the relationship 
with the son. We can even agree that a reasonable explanation for this lack of 
openness is a lack of love. Let us agree but remember that we are dealing with 
an outline of constructing the description of fictional characters. Let us 
assume this entire paragraph is relevant. Does it follow from this description, 
however, that in the case of a partially analogous situation where God’s 
preventing of a personal relationship between some person and God, it is 
impossible to obtain both, such preventing and perfect love of God? Even 
assuming that preventing is understood strongly, as doing something, hence 
some person doesn’t believe that God exist. Is it impossible? Isn’t it evident 
that it is? I do not think so. 
Arguments from analogy are fallible, and what Schellenberg needs in the 
first place is to justify the assumption that such an analogy exists at all and 
that the above paragraph can be applied to understanding the relationship of a 
loving God to His creatures. The only impression one gets after reading this 
paragraph is that this passage uses some common view of God, who is like a 
human parent. Moreover, his love can be measured with the help of 
anthropomorphic conceptions of relationships in a correctly understood 
parental love. This type of argumentation is not an example of a valid 
philosophical argument if we understand philosophy as a careful inquiry about 
the essential nature of God. 
The above paragraphs only tried to undermine the view that we have 
obvious knowledge that would make it possible to rule out the falsehood of 
premise (1), even with such a minimal understanding of openness. We have 
not argued here that we know that God actually prevents a particular person 
from entering a personal relationship with Him at time t. We are just saying 
that we do not know that it is impossible. Even if the argument from 
interpersonal relations were valid for humans, it does not have to be valid for 
God. Assuming the analogy to occur, Schellenberg does not exclude, contrary 
to what he thinks, the last possibility. Moreover, the mere use of an analogy 
as even partially justifying the ascription of openness in its sense of divine 
perfect love itself requires justification. 
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Let us summarize. Schellenberg’s position is that it is impossible that God 
loves us perfectly and is not open in this sense. According to him, it is a claim 
evident in itself. Furthermore, to deepen the understanding that it is true, we 
should see the alleged fact that parents do not have the appropriate openness 
in an allegedly analogous situation. Unfortunately, neither of these claims 
fully supports the thesis that perfect love logically entails openness in a 
minimal sense. This is self-evident truth for me. Thus, Schellenberg is still 
burdened with proof of the truth of this modal theorem. 
Let us leave the link between openness and God’s perfect love; we will 
come back to that in a moment. It is possible to argue with Schellenberg 
differently about the notion of openness. It can be argued that God is open, 
although in a slightly different sense than Schellenberg constructs. Then 
premise (1) is true, and premise (2) is false. In such a situation, it would be 
possible for a perfectly loving God to be open, and at the same time, someone 
does not know if God exists but would like to know it. 
THE DIMENSION OF GOD’S OPENNESS IS RELATED TO TIME 
We should draw our attention to the moment of temporal determination of 
openness, which is vital in the argumentation. Schellenberg, arguing in the 
example of parents-son for the connection of perfect love with openness, 
introduces the time to the argument from hiddenness. His point is to secure 
the temporal interpretation of God’s attributes in this way and to be able to 
relate it to the temporally understood hiddenness. It is also an opportunity to 
present openness so that it does not allow the temporal hiddenness of God. 
In the above context, the topic of the temporary postponement of the 
realization of the conscious and lived relationship between creation and God 
appears for the first time. Schellenberg raises this point in the following text: 
Being “closed” suggests never making a personal relationship possible. But such, it may 
be said, is certainly not the case with God. Even if at a certain time I am unable, just by 
trying, to participate in relationship with God then if I want to, God may still make it 
possible for me to do things that will give me such an ability in the future. Shouldn’t 
this count as a sort of openness to personal relationship on the part of God? (42) 
The point is essential because we are dealing with an eternal God who does 
not have to be understood as “entering into a relationship with his creation at 
a given moment,” now or never, since both members of the relationship have 
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eternity before them.27 Again, Schellenberg seems to be aware of this. 
Therefore, he insists in the paragraph under discussion that we must not get 
distracted: “It is important not to get distracted from this point.” If someone 
tried to associate God’s openness with making it possible for someone to do 
things that would give someone such an ability in the future, it would be a 
“distraction.” 
We cannot but regard Schellenberg’s movement here as rhetorical. The 
God of theism is eternal and knows a person’s entire life. As theism suggests, 
God is present at all times in a person’s entire life through his creative 
activities and the relationship of competition with his creature. Remember that 
we are considering these things from a neutral perspective, simply by 
understanding the position of theism. The idea that God understood in such a 
way, in His perfect love and knowledge, can associate a given person with a 
chance for a fruitful personal relationship at the moment other than the one in 
question, is not a distraction, but an opening possibility of understanding the 
openness of God. Let us add, it is a concept of openness that undermines 
premise (2) and indirectly (3). Why should we not explore this possibility but 
treat it as a dead-end? Again, contrary to Schellenberg’s words, an analogy 
with the human understanding of openness and the belief that “it seems rather 
odd for someone to take as a goal someone else’s openness to personal 
relationship with them while holding that they are already unsurpassably 
loving toward them” (42) are not a sufficient argument. 
In the following stage of his argumentation for the truthfulness of the 
premises, he will try to move from sometimes to always. Schellenberg, when 
discussing the distinction between love and benevolence, notes that “everyone 
… will accordingly be able to agree on at least this much: divine love at some 
time must involve openness to a sharing relationship of the sort we’ve been 
talking about. Otherwise it obviously couldn’t be the greatest love possible” 
(ST).28 Let us accept the truthfulness of the above sentence. However, does 
the following principle ET result from it? We read: “The greatest possible 
divine love at every time must involve openness to a sharing relationship of 
the sort we’ve been talking about” (ET). Of course not. To think that ET 
follows logically from ST under the simple implication ST → ET is itself a 
logical fallacy. Nevertheless, perhaps there is some argument that shows that 
the above implication is true? What does Schellenberg say? He implicitly 
 
27 This way of speaking does not involve the negation of God’s timelessness. Cf. Eleonore STUMP 
and Norman KRETZMANN, “Eternity,” Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 8 (1981): 429–58. 
28 SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument, 43–44. 
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suggests that we should acknowledge the above implication. However, he does 
so not with an appropriate argument but with a question that suggests it is 
happening: “Moreover, suffering from no limitations of knowledge or power 
or (therefore) of resourcefulness, an unsurpassably loving God clearly would 
love finite creatures at every time when they exist. Doesn’t openness at every 
time follow?”29 
Does it not follow that an unsurpassable loving God clearly would love 
finite creatures at every time when they exist? Two things should be noted 
here. First, the sentence “(the greatest possible) divine love at some time must 
involve openness to a sharing relationship of the sort we’ve been talking 
about” (ST’) is a sentence about the relationship between God’s perfect love 
and opennessSch at the time tn.30 On the other hand, the sentence “suffering 
from no limitations of knowledge or power or (therefore) of resourcefulness, 
an unsurpassably loving God clearly would love finite creatures at every time 
when they exist” (ULE) merely states that divine love extends to every 
moment of the existence of loved creatures. The relationship between ET and 
ST’ is not obvious but let us agree that they are consistent. So, does this 
conjunction ST’ and ULE show that ET is true? No, it does not follow. Let us 
omit here that the term should not be applied to the love of God but only to 
the effects of the openness in question. Assuming that we understand what he 
is saying correctly (taking into account the timelessness of God), “at the same 
time” does not lead to “at every time.” 
From the sentence 
Sometimes I call my daughter because I always (invariably) love her. 
it does not follow that 
I always call my daughter because I always (invariably) love her. 
It does not follow from the truthfulness of the first sentence that it is im-
possible to negate the second! Thus, contrary to Schellenberg’s suggestive 
question, it does not follow that there cannot be such a time that there will be 
no lack of technically understood opennessSch of God in a limited time—even 
when it is true that God loves His creation at any time. It would be a logical 
fallacy to admit that it does follow. Perhaps that is why Schellenberg is con-
tent only with the question “Doesn’t openness at every time follow?”. 
 
29 Ibid., 44.  
30 By the indexSch I mean Schellenberg’s specific understanding. 
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Things are even worse for Schellenberg’s argument. Not only is there no 
simple derivation from sometimes to always, and not only did he not present 
an argument allowing him to conclude that in the case of God, however, such 
a derivation does occur, but also arguments may be supplied to undermine 
statements such as ET and (1). They will indicate situations in which particular 
circumstances mean that the realization of the good of a loved one depends on 
the temporary lack of a cognitive relationship with the person who loves him. 
TO DEFEAT (ALL) POSSIBLE DEFEATERS 
Schellenberg is aware of this, and to this end, he makes a two-stage argu-
ment for eliminating such defeaters. “But something else that might inhibit 
this realization is the fact that non-ordinary circumstances can be imagined in 
which human beings might be loving without openness of the sort in ques-
tion—at least for a while” (44, emphasis mine). 
First, this fragment is interesting in yet another way. We know that Schel-
lenberg distinguishes between benevolence and love: “Love entails benevo-
lence but goes beyond it too.” However, the phrase “indeed, the benevolence 
part of love might conceivably come in conflict with the openness-to-relationship 
part” suggests that love should be contrasted with benevolence. This would be 
the case if love were understood to mean the pursuit of one’s own good, and 
benevolence consists in giving or not obstructing the obtaining of some good. 
On such an interpretation, an action aimed at not obstructing the achievement 
of good by a loved one (a daughter Sally) would conflict with the good of the 
personal relationship between her and her father, Fred. This one would require 
Fred to reveal himself to his daughter. 
Interestingly, Schellenberg makes it clear that Fred is not open to a relation-
ship with her at this time in such a situation.31 This is a very strange assess-
ment. This passage, in my opinion, clearly indicates a very bizarre misinter-
pretation of the concept of openness that Schellenberg uses in his argument 
and in his own understanding and assessment of it. Indeed, things like open-
ness and closeness of one person to another are not like events. They are not 
instantaneous but are of the nature of phases. In other words, they are usually 
long-lasting. This is true of people’s attitudes. All the more so, if such temporal 
 
31 “So Fred holds off. Now, by doing so he prevents Sally from being able to participate in 
relationship with him just then, which means he’s not open to relationship with her just then. But isn’t 
this kind and even loving of Fred, rather than un-loving?” (44). 
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definitions can be ascribed to God at all, they should also be understood as 
permanent in relation to God. The reason is the unchanging nature of God of 
love. What we observe in the described story of Fred is consistent with his 
long-term openness in the ordinary, everyday sense and with his desire for 
a relationship with his daughter. It is precisely because he is open that he is 
looking for her. 
So, the fact that Fred holds off is not proof that he has lost his openness to 
her. However, in Schellenberg’s special sense of opennessSch “he’s not openSch 
to relationship with her just then.” Let us agree that this is true in this par-
ticular Schellenberg’s sense. The point here is that the standard concept of 
openness does not exclude hiddenness, unlike opennessSch does.  
It becomes therefore necessary to distinguish between unusual and normal 
situations and acknowledge that “the best love normally or ordinarily is open 
to relationship at every moment of its existence” (44).  
Someone may start wondering why the precision of the last rule for typical 
situations is made in words that seem pertinent to unusual situations “the re-
sources to accommodate the possible consequences of such openness, making 
them compatible with the flourishing of both parties.”32 It becomes under-
standable when we remember that we are interested in God’s openness here. 
Schellenberg is concerned that the qualifier “normally” may seem to introduce 
an uncertainty of truth of (1) and (2) with relation to openness of God. 
ANYTHING (WORTH PURSUING) IS POSSIBLE WITH OMNIPOTENT  
AND PERFECTLY LOVING GOD 
We now come to a critical point in Schellenberg’s argument. The correct-
ness of his argument depends on this case (but not only on it). Schellenberg 
knows this. And we should also be aware of this. Due to possible defeaters of 
his concept of openness, Schellenberg pulls out a cannon and then fires a shot. 
The cannon is the attribute of omnipotence, and the shot is the assumption of 
the truth of what is still under scrutiny! 
Therefore, in order to avoid situations that undermine the general principle 
assumed by part of reasoning (1)–(3), Schellenberg refers to the attribute of om-
nipotence: “God has the resources to accommodate the possible consequences 
of openness to relationship with finite persons, making them compatible with 
 
32 “In other words, and a bit more precisely: things should be expected to be so wherever the lover 
has the resources to accommodate the possible consequences of such openness, making them com-
patible with the flourishing of both parties and of any relationship that may come to exist between 
them” (44–45). 
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the flourishing of all concerned and of any relationship that may come to exist 
between them” and “if God exists as an omnipotent creator and an infinitely 
rich personal reality, then God can make it so.”  
Here we are discussing the nature of God—the love and openness of The 
Almighty. The God of theism is almighty. Of course, it does not follow that 
we can decide concerning any action whether it is within God’s power. Even 
if God could do anything possible and is all-powerful, there remains the task 
of proving that God has the resources to make any possible consequences of 
openness compatible with the flourishing of all concerned and of any interest-
ing relationship that may come to exist between them. From the point of view 
of logic and conditions of epistemic justification of his position, Schellenberg 
cannot just assume that. 
Furthermore, he should not assume that “if also unsurpassably loving, God 
would make it so.” Because Schellenberg’s argument is to justify premise (1), 
and here it is simply based on it. Acceptance of the sentence quoted is begging 
the question. 
It is not that attributing omnipotence to God is attributing to God the ability 
to do anything. There are many things that Almighty God cannot do.33 This 
seems to be a bonum commune of analytical philosophy, and even if there is 
no general agreement on the positions presented in the debate that has been 
going on for decades, Schellenberg’s position is not evident. Moreover, its 
truth should be proved. For even if God is omnipotent, why should this rule 
out the possibility that there are ways of God’s acting and realizing His open-
ness that are consistent with Schellenberg’s temporary lack of openness in the 
technical sense and which will result in a much better personal relationship 
between man and God? 
Again, Schellenberg, who has been defending his argument for a quarter of 
a century, seems to be aware of this. Therefore, he tries to answer this objec-
tion in a rather vague way. Almighty and perfect love allow us to anticipate 
the worlds that God will create: “But if we assume that God is a divine person 
who will create, and will create finite persons, and thus that unlimited and 
unsurpassable love is to come their way, then in effect we have a statement 
being made about what sort of world the actual world shall be” (46).  
More precisely, the above sentence allows us to exclude that God would 
create a world where there may be a conflict between God’s openness and 
some human goods related to God, who will strive for human possession of 
 
33 Marek PEPLIŃSKI and Martyna KOSZKAŁO, “Wszechmoc,” in Przewodnik po filozofii religii: 
nurt analityczny, ed. Janusz Salamon (Kraków: WAM, 2016), 37–59. 
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them. There are no anomalous states of affairs like nonresistant nonbelief with 
some goods that justify them in such a world. This is merely a reiteration, in 
other words, of the argument that “God has the resources to accommodate the 
possible consequences of openness to a relationship with finite persons, making 
them compatible with the flourishing of all concerned and of any relationship 
that may come to exist between them.” It is assumed here that God has the 
appropriate power. Perhaps he has such power because he will not plan for 
limited beings any goods incompatible with his openness. Schellenberg does 
not consider whether there are (or are not possible) much greater goods that 
do not meet these two conditions, closing the discussion with a conventional 
“conclusion” concerning what Almighty Love will do: “If also unsurpassably 
loving, God would make it so.” Just like acceptable goals that a father and 
husband will set for himself, due to his life roles, God will not pursue goals 
that would require a temporary limitation of His openness. 
Again, Schellenberg’s argument follows the principle that what is right 
about man should be treated as right about God. However, let us leave the 
question of value of reasoning by analogy. Suppose Schellenberg wants to use 
the principle that a perfectly loving God creates only such worlds that all 
goods God pursues are relationship-compatible goods in any created world.34 
In that case, he must demonstrate that this “only relationship-compatible 
goods” principle (ORCG) is not merely an apparent resolution to the problem 
of whether almighty God can achieve certain goods compatible with the per-
sonal relationship in question. 
He needs to show that such a God should not have acted otherwise or that it 
would not have been better if He had acted otherwise. For it is possible that the 
worlds that the creator God chooses according to the ORCG principle turn out 
to be very poor in terms of good. For it may be that only some kind of trivial 
good is available in the ORCG worlds. Alternatively, it may be that while there 
are some non-trivial goods in these worlds, in the worlds that are not realized 
according to the ORCG framework, there are far greater goods that can only be 
achieved in the absence of a personal relationship of some creatures to God 
temporarily. Moreover, it may be argued that existence in such worlds is better 
for its inhabitants, and therefore it would be better if God did not follow the 
ORCG principle in creation, or even that he should not do so. 
Schellenberg appears to recognize the importance of this defeater. In any 
case, his statements that follow can be interpreted as an attempt to neutralize 
this type of trouble. To this end, it introduces the principle which we can 
 
34 SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument, 47. 
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formulate as: “No problem, (personal relationship with) God is the solution 
for all goods” (NPGiS): “For any good improving the lives of finite persons 
that might seem to require God to be for a time closed to relationship with us, 
there has to be a way for us to achieve that good, or a good of that type, in and 
perhaps precisely through relationship with God.”35  
Schellenberg believes his statements here are somewhat abstract. This is 
true, although the idea he uses is intriguing. This, however, does not contradict 
the following. 
First, in order to apply the NPGiS principle, Schellenberg must prove that 
it is true. He did not do that. He just put it forward. Second, this principle 
appears to be false or unimportant for two reasons: (a) even if all the good of 
creature consisted in participation in the good of God, the essential goods in 
which creature can participate by participating in God may require a tempo-
rary lack of a personal relationship in question. (b) Even if all the good of 
creature consists in participation in the good of God and is such that it can be 
achieved faster through a relationship with God, it is possible that essential 
goods in which creature can participate by participating in God through rela-
tionshiptype a with God at time t1, would require the lack of belief in God at t1 
in the sense essential for Schellenberg’s argument. 
We can also argue otherwise. (c) Even if all the good of some person con-
sists in participation in the good of God, it is possible that the essential goods 
in which that person can participate by participating in God are available (ac-
cording to the measure of good which is God), only through the lack of belief 
in God in the sense essential to Schellenberg’s argument at a particular time 
t1. Schellenberg must convincingly rule out each of these situations in order 
to make the use of NPGiS in his arguments convincing. 
ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE OPENNESS OF GOD—NOT OPEN PRINCIPLE 
Earlier it was suggested that it is possible to understand the openness of 
God differently, closer to the colloquial understanding of the term than it is to 
Schellenberg’s. At the same time, it is closer to the metaphysical theism of 
Christianity and the other two theistic religions. It is a concept of openness 
that is not instantaneous in the Schellenberg sense. Let us note that predicting 
the God of openness in the sense of Schellenberg is predicting it at some 
temporal point t1. In the next moment, t2 God may not be open or be but again 
in relation to that moment. Schellenberg will, of course, defend the claim that 
 
35 Ibid. 
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Almighty Perfect Love is open at all times. After all, this is what his argument 
is partly about. It does not change the fact that this kind of God’s being open 
is a particular type of time event (or at least such an interpretation is imposed). 
Meanwhile, openness to relationships in our human world is something en-
during. If we try to transfer this understanding to God, what Schellenberg does 
by justifying claims about God with examples from human situations, we should 
consider our actual common intuitions. Schellenberg, instead, modifies them to 
reinforce his argument. Those that may lead to the rejection of the premises of 
his argument are stopped by ad hoc rules such as NPGiS, ORCG, NO, etc. 
Well, this concept of permanent openness is compatible with situations in 
which specific circumstances cause that the realization of the good of a loved 
one depends on the temporary lack of a cognitive relationship with the person 
who loves him. There may be reasons for God not to help a person attain 
knowledge at time t1 that he exists; if God knows that it would result in less 
good than he will do if he knows it at time t2. Another reason could be a great 
evil that will affect this person or other people which God knows will happen 
if that person believes in His existence at t1, but it will not happen when that 
person believes in time t2. Schellenberg wants to stop this type of interpretation 
of (1) and openness in (2), which, while maintaining (1), led to rejection (2), 
using the ORCG and NPGiS principles. However, as has been argued before, 
their application is not a part of philosophical argument unless it is demon-
strated that they are sound and valid and that they exclude the situations for 
which exclusions are designed. This Schellenberg did not do.  
Let us finally examine Schellenberg’s argument for the Not Open principle. 
It says: 
If a person A, without having brought about this condition through resistance of personal 
relationship with person B, is at some time in a state of nonbelief in relation to the 
proposition that B exists, where B at that time knows this and could ensure that A’s 
nonbelief is at that time changed to belief, then it is not the case that B is open at the 
time in question to having a personal relationship with A then. (56–57) 
How does Schellenberg try to justify the Not Open principle? Again, we 
have the statement of “the plausibility of a certain general principle about 
openness and non-openness” and the statement that “it identifies a condition 
in which, at a certain time, a person B clearly is not open to relationship with 
a second person A” (56). The introduction of the principle takes place with 
the help of the case of an adopted child and a mother who, having given up 
the child, has the opportunity to inform him about her existence, but she does 
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not. Such a modest story does not prevent Schellenberg from answering the 
question about this mother’s openness negatively: “Just as we saw in the pre-
vious chapter, in connection with a somewhat similar example, the answer is 
clearly no. Let’s generalize from this example and produce our principle” (57). 
It is by no means obvious. In order to answer the question of whether the 
mother is in a significant sense open to the relationship with the child, it is 
necessary to know her motives and aspirations. We should know if she desires 
and strives for such a relationship, but for some reason, does not make her 
child find out about it. The opposite, knowledge that the above possibility 
does not exist is equally essential. Note that the situation of the described 
opennesswo (‘wo’ stands for wider openness) is compatible and includes being 
not openSch in the Schellenberg sense, at particular time. Therefore, we deal 
with different meanings of openness. Of these different options, Schellenberg 
simply goes for a narrow understanding of opennessSch, which is consistent 
with the choice of a narrow range of activities and inconsistent with the 
broader spectrum of activities available, such as for example, leading to the 
knowledge of the mother’s existence at a different time when it will not con-
flict with some of the interests of the child and mother. The latter is consistent 
with opennesswo. 
The very fact that the understanding of openness is not the only possible 
one makes Schellenberg’s assessment that it is evident that the mother is not 
open to meeting the child not valid. In other words, Schellenberg’s decision 
in the case of this particular fictional mother figure may be true, it may be 
false, and it is certainly doubtful. 
We remember that in all the cases constructed by Schellenberg there are 
doubts as to whether they are correctly interpreted as models of non-opennesswo 
in the colloquial sense, although they meet the author’s specific criterion: at the 
moment t1 an open person acts so as to inform about his existence. Schellenberg 
may introduce a definition to regulate openness, but we may question it. We 
must also remember that the openness that Schellenberg talks about, that is, 
opennessSch, is not openness in the sense we attribute to people. This is because 
it allows the failure to be notified of someone’s existence for the sake of im-
portant goods. Schellenberg wants to interpret God in an anthropomorphic 
spirit, using examples of relationships between people. This is a kind of mis-
take. In reality, however, he uses modified concepts, the application of which 
to some human situations would not allow, without additional knowledge, to 
decide whether a given person is open or not. Based on the generalization of 
such decisions in constructed cases, Schellenberg introduces NO. 
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Schellenberg anticipates possible doubts regarding this principle by asking 
the question: “In these circumstances, how could it still be the case that B is 
open to a meaningful, conscious relationship with A then?” Schellenberg also 
provides a definitive answer. “After all, by not revealing herself, B is doing 
something that makes it impossible for such a relationship to exist at that time, 
and this, according to our definition, is precisely what is involved in not then 
being open to it” (57). However, that was not what he was asking. The ques-
tion was how to understand openness, not whether Schellenberg’s definitions 
and intuitions are consistent. 
The problem is that understanding who a person is and what attitudes they 
de facto adopt cannot be obtained simply through a precise definition that 
regulates the colloquial notion of a given attitude. It always requires carrying 
out specific tests, also trying to exclude our hypothesis about the lack of open-
ness. We set up a straw man otherwise. In particular, one should not establish 
an attitude, or the lack of it, by defining it so narrowly that it necessarily con-
tains effects which its absence may in fact permit.  
Then the author applies NO to God. God possesses all relevant knowledge 
and ability. So if some finite person is ever nonresistantly in a state of nonbe-
lief in relation to God’s existence, then there is no God who is always open to 
a personal relationship with any finite person.36  
The application of this principle to God encounters two difficulties, the 
specific one related to the theistic concept of God’s eternity37 and the general 
one related to the application of opennessSch instead of opennesswo. First, the 
researcher who thinks about NO need not accept the temporal understanding 
of NO. If God is immutable, He has only timeless attributes. If God has the 
attribute of openness, He always has it. Ascribing the attribute of time to God 
because the effects of God’s actions due to this attribute are time-determined 
is groundless and invalid. The God of theism is not related to the world so that 
one can unequivocally infer God’s temporal determination from the temporal 
determination of the effects of his action. 
However, what is essential is how we should understand openness in the 
spirit of Schellenberg or, more broadly, and whether nonresistant nonbelief in 
God at some time t1 is or is not proof that that there is no God open at every 
time. Assuming that openness is an operative attribute—an action/attitude 
consisting in aiming/striving for effect—a relationship with another person for 
a long time, and that it assumes, among other things, as a condition of such 
 
36 SCHELLENBERG, The Hiddenness Argument, 57. 
37 I stand for the timelessness of God.  
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a relationship, the desire to reveal your existence to the other person at some 
time buy not in every time, failure to reveal one’s existence at some time is 
not evidence of lack of openness. However, this matter requires much more 
space for a fuller discussion. 
FINAL REMARKS 
Let us summarize the results of the research presented in this article so far. 
In its first part, we tried to justify the claim that rational, human knowledge 
about God, about His nature and existence or non-existence, is not easy to 
obtain. This does not mean that it is not possible. It appears to be obtainable 
in several ways. It seems that the nature of who God is or could be is available 
to us to some extent. Another issue is the assessment of the value of such 
knowledge, its accuracy, or certainty. However, it is not that these matters are 
obvious; regardless of the sources of knowledge about God and the nature of such 
knowledge, getting to know the truth in this area requires a great deal of inquiry, 
reflection, consideration of different points of view, and constant re-evaluation 
of known answers to the same questions. It also seems to require an appropriate 
spirit, or perhaps sensitivity to the mystery of the world. Putting the matter en-
tirely from a religiously neutral point of view, the world appears as one that 
reveals the existence of God, His Providence and Greatness. At the same time, 
it has features that seem to testify against the existence of God. This trait can 
be seen by presenting things abstractly, from the general philosophical point of 
view of understanding the world and answering metaphysical questions about 
the truth or falsehood of theism. Some aspects of the life of some people seem 
to testify against the existence of God in the light of their understanding. Some 
of them are believers and keep their faith against all odds. Others lose it. Some 
people never seem to have it. How to understand this? 
If we have a rich imagination and creative skills, we can formulate various 
hypotheses. They explain better or worse some, and sometimes most of the 
things that testify for and against God. It does not seem that any set of theo-
rems would explain them all. The search for understanding always remains an 
incompletely realized endeavor. For the sake of this search, it seems that it 
should not be filled with an unreasonable certainty that our interpretation of 
these matters is undoubtedly correct. Does this mean that we should not strive 
to use deductive reasoning in philosophical theology? On the contrary, but we 
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should be aware that if we take non-obvious premises as evident, we risk mak-
ing a mistake in a very important area. 
Let us talk about the method in a more detailed way. Schellenberg urges 
the reader in numerous places to think philosophically and be impartial. Is he 
himself impartial in his research on the value of an argument from hiddenness? 
Is excluding the examination of options where hiddenness turns out to be the 
actual hiddenness of God an expression of the approach being impartial? Or 
is it an expression of a biased limitation on how to interpret the problem? Note 
the way Schellenberg’s argument is made in point (i) of the “Goods” section,38 
how Schellenberg distances himself from the beliefs that differ from his view-
points. He notes that from the perspective of their beliefs, some things may be 
understood differently. Then he notices that the philosophical approach to 
these matters requires that: 
One has to drop the assumption that God exists and that everything somehow fits God’s 
plan (atheism can’t even be taken seriously if that’s one’s frame of mind!), mentally 
bringing together the two relevant concepts: the concept of a finite person at least 
initially disposed to respond negatively to God, and that of a creator of all, a Person 
unlimitedly wonderful and resourceful. (64) 
There is no room here to discuss all the relevant methodological theorems 
and concepts used in The Hiddeness Argument by Schellenberg. Brief remarks 
must suffice: 
a. The question of the existence and non-existence of God in the light of this 
argument should be approached from a perspective that considers not only 
the possibility of atheism but also the possibility of the truth of theism. 
b. It should not disregard various theological concepts of God and possible 
situations. Otherwise, it is simply highly possible that a God who will be 
found to be non-existent will not be the God of theism but some dubious 
construct of narrowly and incorrectly understood theology. 
c. Instead of confirming his position, Schellenberg should try to refute it by 
subjecting it to the strongest tests. Instead, he tries to defend it with the 
help of debatable theoretical solutions that he accepts. 
d. The philosophy of religion, as well as philosophy in general, can be made 
both in engaged and disengaged way of philosophizing.  
In any case, this should be done impartially and with an openness to changing 
one’s understanding of matters. Such openness implies impartiality consisting 
 
38 Ibid., 60–64. 
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in, among other things, that we judge the credibility of an argument based on 
its justification, logical correctness, and relation to what we know about the 
world that is happening or that is possible or impossible, probable or improb-
able. Note that regardless of the deductive form of the argument of hidden-
ness, most of Schellenberg’s reasoning, if it has a justifying function at all, is 
a partial justification. At best, it points to the probability of the premises. 
At the beginning of the text, I suggested that we are dealing with some kind 
of error in the case of premise (6) (“If no perfectly loving God exists, then God 
does not exist”). If I am allowed to express my views on these matters, this 
sentence seems to me to be completely counterintuitive. How would we know 
that, even with the various arguments that God should be perfectly loving, 
there is no God who is different from what we think He should be? The doc-
trine that God is love—albeit love in a different sense than that postulated by 
Schellenberg—was brought by Christianity. However, apart from the teach-
ings and example of Christ, does Schellenberg’s reasoning provide us with the 
knowledge to acknowledge truthfulness of (6)? I disagree. 
 However, let us run a thought experiment. Let us treat this whole argu-
ment (which is a very narrow way of understanding God and His way of man-
aging the creation) as a test of the theistic hypothesis, with some specific un-
derstanding of the terms involved. Let us now make a friendly move towards 
the author of the argument. Let us accept the argument based on the recognition 
that our world is its model. The concepts of perfect love, openness, and om-
nipotence are understood here unambiguously in Schellenberg’s way. The ap-
proach to God he proposes ignores the entire spectrum of possible ways of 
understanding the realization of God’s perfect love, his much richer openness, 
which, however, would sometimes result in a different way, moment, and 
stages of entering of some beings into a relationship with the Creator. Let us 
call the (perfectly loving)Sch God such a GodSch who fulfills Schellenberg’s 
narrowed conditions of perfect love, namely that the world created by such 
a GodSch does not contain unresisting unbelief. When treating (1) and (2) as 
hypotheses about GodSch (who loves perfectly)Sch, where these premises par-
tially define GodSch, we can treat the reasoning from (1) to (5) as a falsification 
of the hypothesis of the existence of such a God. Let us remember how physics 
is done. Falsifying a physical hypothesis about some aspect of the material 
universe does not always lead to the rejection of the object of study but calls 
for the formulation of a new, better hypothesis. Similarly, the rejection of the 
existence of GodSch with a specifically understood (perfect love)Sch is not suf-
ficient to deny (every) God a perfect love that results in other actions, and it 
does not follow that no God exists. 
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The following reasoning is not correct. 
(5) No (perfectly loving)Sch God exists (from 3 and 4). 
(6) If no (perfectly loving)Sch God exists, then GodSch does not exist. 
(7) God does not exist (from 5 and 6). 
Because from (5) and (6) what follows is not (7) but (7)Sch: 
(7)Sch GodSch does not exist (from 5 and 6). 
A theist can agree with this conclusion and still consistently remain a theist. 
For the only thing we obtain in the case of the conclusion (7)Sch is a justifica-
tion for the claim that there is no such God as Schellenberg constructs Him.39 
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THE HIDDENNESS ARGUMENT AND THE GROUND OF ITS SOUNDNESS 
S u m m a r y  
The paper refers to the argument from hiddenness as presented in John Schellenberg’s book The 
Hiddenness Argument and the philosophical views expressed there, making this argument 
understandable. It is argued that conditionals (1) and (2) are not adequately grounded. Schellenberg 
has not shown that we have the knowledge necessary to accept the premises as true. His justifications 
referring to relations between people raise doubts. The paper includes an argument that Schellenberg 
should substantiate its key claim that God has the resources to accommodate the possible 
consequences of openness to a relationship with finite persons, making them compatible with the 
flourishing of all concerned and of any relationship that may come to exist between them. At the end 
of the text, I propose to treat the argument as a rejection of an anthropomorphic God. 
Keywords: Hiddenness of God; J. L. Schellenberg; openness of God; perfect love of God; theistic 
personalism.  
ARGUMENT Z UKRYCIA I PODSTAWA JEGO TRAFNOŚCI 
S t r e s z c z e n i e  
Artykuł odwołuje się do argumentu z ukrycia przedstawionego w książce J. L. Schellenberga The 
Hiddenness Argument i wyrażanych tam poglądów filozoficznych, które stanowią kontekst dla 
zrozumienia tego argumentu. Twierdzi się tu, że przesłanki (1) i (2) argumentu nie są odpowiednio 
uzasadnione. Schellenberg nie wykazał, że posiadamy wiedzę niezbędną do uznania tych przesłanek 
za prawdziwe. Wątpliwości budzą jego uzasadnienia odnoszące się do relacji między ludźmi. Artykuł 
zawiera argument, że Schellenberg powinien uzasadnić swoje kluczowe twierdzenie, że Bóg 
dysponuje zasobami, aby pogodzić możliwe konsekwencje otwartości na relację z ograniczonymi 
osobami, czyniąc je kompatybilnymi z rozkwitem wszystkich zainteresowanych i wszelkich relacji, 
które mogą zaistnieć między nimi. Na końcu tekstu proponuję potraktować ten argument jako 
odrzucenie idei antropomorficznego Boga. 
Słowa kluczowe: ukrycie Boga; J. L. Schellenberg; otwartość Boga; doskonała miłość Boga; 
personalizm teistyczny. 
